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It seems obvious that the development and implementa-tion of environmental policy should be based on the
best available scientific evidence. However, such evidence
is often highly uncertain and inherently contestable.
Balancing diverse scientific information input poses seri-
ous challenges to policy makers even where broad scien-
tific consensus has been reached, for example where mul-
tilateral governance agreements address complex issues
such as global climate change (UNFCCC 1998) or sus-
tainable harvesting of marine resources (Neubauer et al.
2013). The nature of evidence itself is often contested,
especially in situations where policy debates involve dif-
ferent or competing value systems (Oreskes 2004; Pielke
2007; Adams and Sandbrook 2013). How scientists
should properly and effectively engage with such debates –
for instance, to either independently advise policy makers
or publicly advocate for certain policies and political out-
comes – are matters addressed in the literature of many
disciplines (eg biodiversity conservation, health, and
international development).
Even more perplexing are situations where the scientific
evidence base is attacked or ignored for ideological rea-
sons, or because it threatens powerful vested interests. The
cover of a recent edition of National Geographic (March
2015) simply describes the affront as “the war on science”.
There is an apparent trend, particularly in wealthy liberal
democracies of the English-speaking world (notably
Australia, Canada, and the US), to ignore or overlook sci-
entific evidence on important environmental issues, and
even to defund or abolish independent sources of scien-
tific advice. Well-known cases include failures to account
for projected climate-change impacts in approving major
fossil-fuel developments; unsustainable exploitation of
marine fisheries and tropical forests; over-allocation of
groundwater resources; and developments in low-lying
coastal regions that ignore projected rises in sea level (see
WebTable 1 for examples specific to Australia). 
Turner (2013) argued compellingly that the Canadian
Government has, over the past several years, mounted a
systematic attack on science and scientists in order to
facilitate rapid resource extraction. Turner further con-
tended that scientific input to policy development has
been marginalized systematically in three different ways –
by reducing the government’s capacity to gather data, by
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In a nutshell:
• There is a growing tendency for policy makers to dismiss or
ignore scientific advice when making environmental deci-
sions – how should the scientific community respond to this
challenge?
• While there are many constructive actions that could be
taken, we suggest that in democratic societies the wider com-
munity needs to be better informed and empowered if deci-
sion making on difficult environmental issues is to improve
• Here, we focus on engaging the broader community in
expanded scenario-planning exercises, including testing com-
munity preferences in targeted public surveys
• This expanded approach is mostly untested to date but offers
considerable promise for informing the environmental policy
development process
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defunding or abolishing independent sources of scientific
advice, and by censoring communication between scien-
tists and stakeholders. Many commentators have made
similar observations regarding climate-change policy in
the US (http://bit.ly/WGtp5a) and in Australia (http://
bit.ly/1UnDHiU; http://bit.ly/1UnDSuI). 
How should the scientific community respond to this
challenge to evidence-based policy? Potential actions
include: promoting independent review of policies; sup-
porting the scientific education of legislators and main-
stream media; fostering a closer dialogue on policy
issues with the business community (beyond interac-
tion regarding commercial technologies and innova-
tion); and encouraging community participation
through online discussion, citizen science, and
activism. However, as noted by commentators who
focus on the nexus between science inputs, policy for-
mulation, and political action, there is often a tacit
assumption by many in the scientific community that
simply getting the science “right” is an adequate prereq-
uisite for political action. In most instances – but espe-
cially for complex issues – policy development is proba-
bly not a linear process, but is demonstrably fuzzy,
creative, contested, and multifactorial (Pielke 2007;
Adams and Sandbrook 2013).
We would argue that the typical
science advocacy responses are neces-
sary but insufficient unless the
broader community is better
informed and engaged. We describe
two examples of recurring Australian
development myths, and consider
how to inform and empower commu-
nities to influence participatory,
evidence-based decision-making pro-
cesses – illustrated here with refer-
ence to application of expanded sce-
nario-planning tools augmented with
public-opinion surveys. 
n Australian environmental policy
that ignores scientific evidence
Australia is well-positioned to tackle
environmental problems effectively.
It enjoys a rich environmental sci-
ence expertise (Harrison 2006),
mature institutional capability, high
relative wealth and corruption-free
governance, and a public sector with
the capacity and professed willing-
ness to incorporate scientific input
into evidence-based policy formula-
tion (Australian Government 2012).
Yet denial of scientific evidence is
abundantly apparent in Australia,
exemplified here by two contempo-
rary examples (Figure 1) with far-reaching development
implications. 
Northern development
Both the conservative and progressive sides of Australian
politics have developed policies that pledge to “develop
the north”, and specifically to develop “the northern food
bowl”, a recurring aspiration since the early days of
European settlement in the 1800s. There is a political
perception that because the savanna landscapes of north-
ern Australia are extensive (~2 million km2) and sparsely
populated (0.3 persons km–2), and contain seasonally
plentiful water near the coast, the region is ripe for devel-
opment (Australian Government 2015). Such claims are
usually accompanied by points about the burgeoning
demand for protein from the growing middle class of
Asian countries, and suggestions that agricultural produc-
tion in the established food-growing regions of southeast-
ern Australia is constrained by water scarcity, a limitation
that is being amplified by climate change. 
However, there is ample scientific evidence to suggest
that the potential for agricultural development in north-
ern Australia is severely limited. Evaporation generally
exceeds annual rainfall, and the flat topography prevents
Figure 1. Location of the northern savannas and central Victorian highlands case
studies. Extensive (free-range) cattle production is the primary land use in the northern
savannas region (Fox et al. 2001). However, much of the savannas are relatively
unsuitable for cattle farming, while “carbon farming”, especially when paired with
improved fire management (green area; Whitehead et al. 2014), offers new economic
opportunities.
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water storage. As much as 90% of the northern savannas
are used ostensibly for beef cattle pastoralism – largely
under extensive (as opposed to intensive, irrigated, or
grain-fed) production systems (Figure 2a). Industry reports
show that most northern pastoral enterprises are neither
economically viable nor sustainable (McLean et al. 2014)
due to low-fertility soils, seasonal access restrictions, lim-
ited infrastructure, high labor and input costs, and distant
and volatile markets. Mining and energy extraction indus-
tries are major contributors to the regional economy, but
are limited to restricted onshore and offshore develop-
ment sites, and exhibit “boom–bust” cycles driven by
volatile global commodity markets and fluctuating prices.
Aspirations for a “northern food bowl” and associated
agricultural development were first comprehensively
debunked by Bruce Davidson (1965) in his critical eco-
nomic analysis, The northern myth. More recently, authori-
tative assessments have reinforced the view that the poten-
tial for large-scale irrigable agriculture is very limited
(Figure 2b). The Northern Australia Land and Water
Taskforce (NALWT 2009) estimated that the potential for
growth in irrigable land is only two or three times the area
currently under production – with a maximum of 40 000
ha. There is also some relatively small potential for “mosaic
irrigation”, based on localized groundwater resources
(Petheram et al. 2013a, 2013b). In comparison, the total
agricultural area irrigated in Australia’s Murray–Darling
Basin in 2010–2011 was 1.2 million ha (Australian Bureau
of Statistics 2013). Furthermore, large irrigation projects in
the north would require enormous, non-redeemable public
expenditure on infrastructure, and might be more viable if
used for non-food crops that do not require refrigeration,
such as cotton, sugarcane, and sandalwood (NALWT
2009; Petheram et al. 2013a, 2013b).
Such development options have little support among
many of the Indigenous (Aboriginal) residents who com-
prise the majority of the non-urban, regional population
and who own much of the land under either freehold title
or non-exclusive title arrangements, yet are mostly
impoverished. Although some Indigenous savanna resi-
dents, particularly those with educational and training
qualifications, may take up mainstream employment
opportunities (eg in the mining, tourism, health, educa-
tion, defense, and pastoral sectors), many others, particu-
larly in remote communities, fulfill other priorities,
including cultural responsibilities for “looking after [the]
country” (Altman and Kerins 2012). 
The northern savannas are highly fire-prone, provid-
ing options for both rural Indigenous residents and pas-
toralists to develop diversified “carbon farming” enter-
prises, especially through improved fire management
activities (Figure 2c; Russell-Smith et al. 2013; Walsh et
al. 2014). However, given the apparent fixation of
Australian governments on pursuing limited visions of
northern agricultural development, opportunities for
north Australia’s rural residents to engage in decision-
Figure 2. Land-use options in Australia’s northern savannas:
(a) free-range Bos indicus cattle production, restricted by
extensive infertile, laterized (deeply chemically weathered) soils;
(b) irrigated agriculture (including center-pivot irrigation of
peanuts), restricted by limited aquifers and seasonal water
availability; (c) carbon farming (greenhouse-gas emissions
abatement; sequestration into non-living and living biomass
components) through improved fire management over extensive
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making processes that might deliver more culturally and
environmentally appropriate forms of development are
limited and dwindling.
Alpine and mountain ash forest logging in Victoria
The tall eucalypt mountain ash (Eucalyptus regnans) and
alpine ash (Eucalyptus delegatensis) forests of Victoria are
some of the world’s most spectacular forests, with old-
growth stands containing the tallest flowering plants on
Earth. These ecosystems provide much of the water for
the city of Melbourne (Viggers et al. 2013), are some of
the most carbon-dense forests worldwide (Keith et al.
2009), and support habitat for endangered species such as
Leadbeater’s possum (Gymnobelideus leadbeateri; Figure 3;
Lindenmayer et al. 2013). 
These mountain ash and alpine ash forests are among
the most extensively studied ecosystems, both in
Australia and globally (Lindenmayer 2009). However,
the scientific knowledge accumulated through these stud-
ies is not reflected in regional forest management poli-
cies, particularly those concerning biodiversity conserva-
tion and fire policy and management.
For instance, it has been well established for more than
20 years that widespread clearcut logging operations in
mountain ash forests substantially degrade the suitability
of forest habitats for Leadbeater’s possum and up to 40
other species of vertebrates that are dependent on large,
old, cavity-bearing trees (Figure 4; Lindenmayer 1994).
Moreover, since the 2009 wildfires – which destroyed
~43% of habitat for Leadbeater’s possum – controls on
logging have been loosened rather than strengthened
(Lindenmayer and Possingham 2013). Government poli-
cies purportedly attempting to conserve the possum have
failed to incorporate recommendations for improved
management based on three decades
of science (Lindenmayer et al. 2014),
and are likely to have negative
impacts on the species. 
A further example relates to relation-
ships between logging and wildfire.
The mountain ash and alpine ash
forests in Victoria are subject to rare
but catastrophic high-severity fires, the
intensity of which is strongly linked to
weather. Recent analyses indicate that
fire severity is also related to logging
history and is greatly elevated in stands
of forest 7–40 years after logging
(Taylor et al. 2014). This means that
the ~47 100 ha of forest that has been
clearcut and regenerated in the past
four decades is at risk of high-severity
fire. Moreover, a further 17 655 ha of
forest is scheduled to be clearcut in the
coming 5 years under the Victorian
Government’s Timber Release Plan
(Government of Victoria 2011). Large areas of fire-prone
young forest are close to towns and settlements, which are
therefore at risk from high-severity wildfire. Yet, to date
there has been no attempt by the Government of Victoria
to mitigate fire risks in regional towns by curtailing
clearcutting in nearby forested areas.
Finally, despite the large areas of mountain ash and
alpine ash forest logged in the past four decades and the
extensive areas of forest burned in the 2009 fires (Burns et
al. 2014), the Government of Victoria has made only lim-
ited attempts to reduce the amount of harvesting pressure
on the forest estate. This means that the rate of cutting of
the smaller remaining areas of unburned “green” forest has
actually increased. It is not possible to claim that these
problems are unknown or poorly understood. The status of
mountain ash forests following the 2009 wildfires is well
documented, as is the biology and ecology of the organisms
of conservation concern inhabiting those forests. Stands of
trees old enough to be sawlogs (felled tree trunks, suitable
for timber) may well be exhausted within the coming
10–15 years, leading to the possible removal of the sawlog
industry from the Central Highlands region. Despite this,
the policy position of the Victorian Government is set to
“lock in” 20-year guaranteed wood supplies from public
forests to the forest industry (Victorian Department of
Primary Industries 2011), even though there may be insuf-
ficient timber resources to do this.
The likely result of “locking in” pulpwood and timber
supplies will be to ensure the extinction of iconic species
such as Leadbeater’s possum, as well as the sawlog sector of
the forest industry, and compromise other “new century
industries” such as managing native forests for carbon stores
(Keith et al. 2014) and for the provision of other ecosystem
services such as water supply and recreation. Thus, policy
and management do not match either the conservation sci-
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ence or the resource (ie ecosystem services, including wood
supply) science. The wider community needs to be both
better informed about development options and more
empowered to contribute to the decision-making process.
n How can scientists contribute to improved
environmental decision making?
Clearly, scientists can and should continue to build the
weight of evidence on issues through their core activity of
undertaking rigorous, high-quality research, and publish-
ing in peer-reviewed academic journals. Researchers
should also continue to make scientific evidence and its
interpretation more accessible to all stakeholders, scientists
and non-scientists alike. This already happens in many dif-
ferent ways, but considerable progress could still be made
on two fronts. First, the assembly of policy-neutral, system-
atic reviews of evidence should be expanded, perhaps
along similar lines to those of the Cochrane Collaboration
in the healthcare sector (www.cochrane.org; see Bilotta
et al. 2014). Reviews such as these are already being
made publicly available through organizations like the
Collaboration for Environmental Evidence (www.environ-
mentalevidence.org), the US’s Union of Concerned
Scientists (www.ucsusa.org), and the European Network of
Scientists for Social and Environmental Responsibility
(www.ensser.org). Second, there are growing calls for sci-
entists to collaborate with knowledge brokers to transform
scientific narratives into community dialogues as a way of
effectively communicating knowledge and influencing
public policy (Mauz et al. 2012). Citizen-science initiatives
potentially expand the participation base and the audience
for such community dialogues.
These and other, similar ideas are not novel, but they
have yet to be systematically applied to the process of
assembling and assessing scientific evidence for complex
public-policy challenges. We recognize that scientific
advice is just one kind of input to policy formulation
(Head 2008), and can be trumped by ideology and vested
interests (WebTable 1). Other approaches are needed
that permit, encourage, and sustain broader, informed
community engagement and consensus building. 
n Enhanced scenario planning with public-opinion
surveys as part of the solution
Solving complex problems requires an adequate under-
standing of both how the system in question works and a
vision of shared goals for the system among stakeholders
(Costanza 2001). The lack of a shared vision and goals is
one important reason why scientific evidence may be
ignored in management and policy. Goals such as pro-
moting the “northern food bowl”, or continuing past har-
vesting practices in Victoria while maintaining minimal
environmental and social impacts, are not consistent
with possibilities for the region or the ideas of other
important stakeholders. Such policies are inherently
unsustainable and, more importantly, ignore or discount
competing views for alternative futures for these distinc-
tive regions and do not adequately engage the public in
the process of goal creation.
We argue that a broadly shared vision about the world
we want to live in, informed by the best available science,
provides a better platform for sound policy development.
In essence, this is what democratic governance should do.
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Figure 4. The various stages of clearcutting in montane ash
forests: (a) sellable trees are cut, leaving dead stems and debris; (b)
debris is burned in a high-intensity regeneration fire; (c) the burned
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Unfortunately, current versions of democracy give too
much weight to powerful special-interest groups (Gilens
and Page 2014) whose visions and goals are not consis-
tent with those of the broader public, including the scien-
tific community. One of the consequences of the anti-cli-
mate science movement – particularly in the
English-speaking world – is to paint science as just
another interest group, with a vested interest in exagger-
ating problems to increase research budgets.
Scenario planning (Ringland and Schwartz 1998;
Peterson et al. 2003) is one tool that can help to build a
shared vision. Scenario planning differs from forecasts,
projections, and predictions in that it explores plausible
rather than probable futures (Peterson et al. 2003).
Although aspects of the depicted futures may come to
exist, these futures are best viewed as caricatures of
reality, which we can use to learn from and to build
consensus.
Scenario planning is based on four assumptions: that
(1) the future is unlike the past, and is extensively shaped
by human choice and action; (2) the future cannot be
foreseen, but exploring possible futures can inform pre-
sent decisions; (3) there are many possible futures, and so
scenarios lie within a “possibility space”; and (4) scenario
development involves both rational analysis and creative
thinking (TFP 2003).
Scenarios are best suited to exploring situations of high
uncertainty and low controllability (Peterson et al. 2003).
For example, climate change and global governance are
largely beyond the control of a particular region. In these
situations, scenarios can help to illuminate the conse-
quences of these uncontrollable forces and to formulate
robust local responses. Importantly, scenarios can help to
reveal policy and value changes that may be required, and
identify critical decision points where such changes can
most strongly affect outcomes (Gallopín 2002).
How could scenario planning be applied to northern
development and the clearcutting of ash forests in
Victoria in ways that will help to build a shared vision
that engages the public? Scenario planning itself is cer-
tainly not new, but using scenarios as the basis for broad
public-opinion surveys and discussion has not been
done before. As in most scenario-planning exercises,
representatives of major stakeholder groups should col-
laborate to envision plausible futures for these areas.
The resulting scenarios would cover the full range of
options, from business-as-usual development to more
sustainable approaches. In all cases, the scenarios must
be “plausible”, meaning that they should take scientific
evidence into account and combine rational analysis
and creative thinking.
Scenario planning, even in contentious situations,
can bring stakeholders together to consider options for
the whole system (Kahane 2004). It allows participants
to step out of their special-interest mode and begin to
develop shared ideas. Scenario planning is now embed-
ded in the strategic thinking of some of the world’s most
influential institutions, including the World Bank and
United Nations Environment Programme. This
approach was also used in the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment to chart possible trajectories for the global
community, based on the rate and extent of ecological
change and interactions with management policies
(MA 2005). Scenario planning need not be static; sce-
narios can be revisited and reworked as part of a long-
term formal process: for example, the iterative applica-
tion of scenario planning to guide water management in
the Netherlands since the 1950s (Haasnoot and
Middelkoop 2012).
Once a range of scenarios is created, a consensus often
emerges among participants as to which options are
most desirable, given underlying uncertainties about the
future. For example, a scenario-planning process in
South Africa involving all political parties developed
four scenarios for the country’s transition out of
apartheid (Kahane 2004). The “flight of the flamingos”
scenario, which imagines both black and white South
Africans rising up together, emerged as the clear con-
sensus and led to the Truth and Reconciliation
Committee and other strategies that allowed a relatively
peaceful and cooperative transition in a situation that
might have otherwise become even more violent and
repressive. The development of an evidence-based
understanding of how the world works, combined with a
shared vision of how people want it to work, are power-
ful tools to address even the most complex and recalci-
trant of problems.
Another example of a strategic scenario-planning
exercise focused on the future of the food system and
was undertaken by Chatham House (2008), an indepen-
dent policy institute. This policy research project
explored the effects of global trends on the networks
that supply wheat and dairy products to the UK market.
The exercise drew from a core panel of stakeholders rep-
resenting a wide cross-section of different sectors within
the food system, informed by researchers from many
institutions across the UK. It identified critical variables
associated with oil prices, food stocks, and prevailing
economic conditions, and developed four very different
but internally coherent scenarios for the evolution of
the British food supply system. The highly participatory
nature of the exercise – from the cabinet strategy office
to industry leaders and representatives of leading NGOs
and consumer organizations – meant that the research
was informing public and private policy development
well before it was finally published. Policy development
on this complex, long-term issue was seen to be neces-
sarily a shared enterprise between government, industry,
and civil society.
However, to move beyond the environmental policy-
making problems discussed above requires that scenarios
developed by “expert” stakeholder representatives be
shared and used in a much broader context, to meaning-
fully engage the public in the debate.
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n Building on scenario planning to identify preferred
futures
To take the process of empowerment to its logical conclu-
sion, we contend that scenarios should be used as the
basis for broad public-opinion surveys (Costanza 2000;
Costanza et al. 2015). Although such sampling of public
opinion around future scenarios – as far as we are aware –
has been limited, an instructive example is provided by
the designers of an online scenario game for exploring
futures in New Zealand (LRSWG 2007). Several hun-
dred game participants provided feedback on the scenario
situation they considered New Zealand to be in now,
where they would like the country to be in 50 years, and
where they thought the country was actually heading.
While most respondents sought a future characterized by
greater environmental sustainability and social cohesion,
they perceived the country to be heading in the opposite
direction. 
The inexorable spread of the internet and rising famil-
iarity with online survey instruments and engagement
tools have created a basis for developing new approaches
to informing, engaging, and consulting the community in
developing more sustainable approaches to environmen-
tal management and making difficult resource-allocation
decisions. Such approaches could combine strategic sce-
nario-planning exercises with online sharing of data and
analyses. Subsequent well-targeted surveys would inform
citizens about complex and contested issues, and improve
the chances of policy decisions being based on sound sci-
entific evidence.
n Conclusion
We have attempted to identify useful approaches for sci-
entists to engage with the policy development process,
particularly in instances where compelling evidence con-
tinues to be ignored due to differing ideologies or vested
interests. While science advocacy is both useful and nec-
essary (Kassen 2011), we concur with arguments
advanced by Pielke (2007) and Adams and Sandbrook
(2013) that the “honest broker” role of scientists in com-
plex political debates (even where the science may seem
straightforward) should be to inform, guide, and expand
the options available to policy makers, rather than to
advocate for specific, prescriptive solutions. Given inher-
ent long-term potential for scientists to be perceived as
yet another interest group in support of certain lines of
evidence (and research funding), we advocate for a
broader democratization of the policy-making process. To
do this requires much more active public engagement in
the process of coming to consensus about the future we all
want and overcoming special-interest biases. Scenario-
planning exercises augmented with well-constructed and
targeted public-opinion surveys of those scenarios have
considerable, but untested, potential for helping us to
make more prudent decisions about our collective future.
This approach can incorporate the best scientific evi-
dence in a way the public can understand and could help
to build the shared vision necessary to truly serve the pub-
lic interest.
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